ABSTRACT Deoxys is a third-round candidate of the CAESAR authenticated encryption competition. In this paper, we present the first cryptanalysis of Deoxys in the single-key model. Specifically, we propose a multiple impossible differentials attack of 8-round Deoxys-BC-256, which can reuse the plaintexts to sieve subkeys, so that the sieving efficiency can be improved. Meanwhile, we improve the process of sieving subkeys and utilize various techniques, including tweak schedule considerations, early abort technique, the new early abort technique, and so on, which help to reduce the complexity. The time, memory, and data complexities are 2 123.9 memory accesses, 2 99.2 bytes, and 2 117 chosen plaintexts, respectively. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Tweakable block cipher was proposed in 2002 by Liskov et al. [1] . For the sequence of the 16-byte plaintexts, in contrast to the encrypt process of traditional block cipher C = E key (P), tweakable block cipher provides an additional parameter called ''tweak'' and the encrypt process can be expressed as: C = E key (P, Tweak). This tweak is usually public but can increase the variability.
To make the design more resistant to related-key attacks, Jean et al. [8] presented the TWEAKEY framework at ASIACRYPT 2014. Based on the TWEAKEY framework, the design of Deoxys-BC follows AES, but both the tweakey schedule and the number of rounds are different. Deoxys-BC was submitted to the CAESAR competition and was selected as one of the third-round candidates in 2016. The designers' analysis in [9] focused on linear and differential cryptanalysis. Then Cid et al. provided the first independent security analysis of Deoxys, and they presented boomerang and rectangle attacks to Deoxys-BC in the related-tweakey model [17] , which need both non-zero key difference and non-zero tweak difference.
Since Deoxys is an AES-type cipher with an improved tweakey schedule, the designers claimed that the security bound of Deoxys-BC against most of attacks matches the bounds of AES, and they ''encourage to investigate attack vectors that rely on some additional property of the [9] . Table I summaries some attacks of AES-128 and the best-performing attacks are meet-in-themiddle and impossible differential cryptanalysis on 7-round AES-128. We want to find a stronger cryptanalysis in the single-model than these.
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A. OUR RESULTS
We first provide security analysis of Deoxys in the single-key model. Specifically, we first propose an impossible differential attack on 8-round Deoxys-BC-256, which is one round more than the best result of AES-128. Only 1-byte non-zero tweak difference is needed. In order to ensure that there exits the non-zero tweak difference, we provide the loose constraint that the key size should be less than 240 bits (key size of Deoxys-BC-256 can be greater than or equal to 128 bits). Utilizing the idea that non-zero tweak difference input will cancel a difference in the attack trail [16] , we construct three attack trails and present a multiple impossible differentials attack. Different from the scenario in [4] , we improve the process in sieving subkeys. More precisely, we first fix the common subkey bits of the three attack trails, and then sieve other 7-byte subkeys. If all the 7-byte subkeys are wrong, the current common subkey is wrong, so it is unnecessary to be sieved again in another attack trail. Therefore, the sieving efficiency can be improved. Furthermore, we also utilize additional techniques, including tweak schedule considerations, the new early abort [12] , early abort [15] etc., which help to reduce the complexity. We obtain the best result of Deoxys-BC-256 in the single-key model so far.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly describes Deoxys-BC and provides the notations used in this paper. Section III proposes 4-round impossible differentials of Deoxys. Section IV presents a multiple impossible differentials attack on 8-round Deoxys-BC-256 and performs a complexity analysis on our attack. Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DEOXYS-BC
Deoxys, an AES-like tweakable block cipher with SPN structure, supports the key and the tweak with the sizes of 256 and 384 bits. The numbers of rounds for the two variants are 14 and 16, respectively. The plaintext, the ciphertext and the internal state of Deoxys are treated as a 4 × 4 matrix over the finite field GF(2 8 ). Similar to AES, round function of Deoxys applies four operations as follows:
(1) AddRoundTweakey(ART ): This operation includes an XOR with the round subtweakeys which are derived from the master tweakey.
(2) SubBytes(SB): This operation applies the AES S-box on each byte of the state. After the last round, an extra AddRoundTweakey ART operation is applied to produce the ciphertext. Fig. 1 describes the tweakey schedule algorithm of Deoxys-BC-256. Designers denote the concatenation of the key K and the tweak T as KT , i.e. KT = K ||T . The key size can be greater than or equal to 128 bits. The tweakey state is divided into two 128-bit words, with the first and second words of KT being W 1 and W 2 . In order to obtain other round tweakeys, the following tweakey schedule is adopted: where LFSR 2 is the applications of LFSR on each byte of tweakey words. The byte permutation h is given as follows: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 6 11 12 5 10 15 0 9 14 3 4 13 2 7 8 The i-th round subtweakey is defined as:
where RC i are constants. For more details, please refer to [9] .
B. NOTATIONS
Some notations are given as follows: The j-th column of
The j-th column of k i through the SR operation, j = 0, 1, 2, 3
In this paper, we denote the whitening tweakey as k 0 .
III. IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL DISTINGUISHERS OF DEOXYS
In this section, we will present three impossible differential distinguishers with same input difference. We utilize the tweak input difference with a single active byte T 0, [14] (i.e. T 0, [14] = 0, and other bytes difference are zero). In order to ensure T 0, [14] = 0, the key size must be less than 240 bits in this paper. Based on the tweakey schedule, we can get T 3, 
IV. MULTIPLE IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK ON 8-ROUND DEOXYS-BC-256
We construct three attack trails and present a 8-round multiple impossible differentials attack. Fig. 3 shows one of 8-round attack trails, and we can see that the non-zero tweak difference T 1, [7] will cancel the difference x ART 1, [7] in the state at first round.
We denote the key size as 128 + x bits (x ≤ 112), so the tweak size is 128 − x bits. For 
A. THE PROCESS OF 8-ROUND ATTACK ON DEOXYS-BC-256
In this section, the process can be divided into three phases:
Precomputation Phase: In order to reduce the complexity, we precompute tables H , Q and i , i = 1, 2, 3. 16 possible values of ( in , out ). Table Q : We guess all possible values of T 0, [14] . Based on the tweakey schedule algorithm, we calculate 2 8 values of 4-byte T 1, [7] | T 6, [8] |T 7, [9] |T 8, [14] , and store them in the table Q indexed by 2 8 possible values of T 0, [14] . whose corresponding difference x SR 6,col(0) is zero in byte 0 or 1 or 2 (i.e. it satisfies the output difference of three distinguishers). Store the remaining 2 16 × 3 × 2 −8 ≈ 2 9 .6 values of x MC 6, [2, 3] in the table 1 . whose corresponding difference satisfies the output difference of three distinguishers. Store the remaining 2 9.6 values of x MC 6, [1, 2] in the table 3 . We prepare tables i , i = 1, 2, 3 for extracting the equivalent subkeys of k * 7, [7, 10] , k * 7,[0,10] and k * 7, [10, 13] , respectively. Data Collecting Phase: Considering the non-zero tweak difference T 1, [7] and T 8, [14] , which can be obtained from the table Q, the data collecting phase is divided into three steps:
(1) Select 2 32 plaintexts that take all possible values in the 4 bytes at position [3, 4, 9, 14] and other bytes remain constant. Meanwhile, select 2 8 tweaks that differ only in one tweak byte T 0, [14] . Then we take this 2 40 plaintexttweak inputs (P, T ) as a structrue and get the corresponding ciphertexts. For the 2 40 ciphertexts, calculate 1,2) ]. Using the plaintext pair sieve method based on quicksort algorithm [14] , select 2 40+39 ×2 −48 = 2 31 pairs of plaintext-tweak-ciphertext (P, T , C; P , T , C ) with x AK 8,[0,3,6,7,9,10] = 0.
(2) For the 2 31 remaining ciphertext pairs, considering the corresponding T 8, [14] , calculate x AK [7] ]] can be obtained. For the pair of (P, T ; P , T ), calculate x ART 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] = P [3, 4, 9, 14] T [3, 4, 9, 14] . Then x ART 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] can be obtained by accessing the Online Attack Phase: The online attack phase can be summarized in the following steps. Utilizing the early abort technique [15] , step 1 and step 2 select the pairs which satisfy the expected attack trail of 7-th and 8-th rounds. Using the early abort [6] , [15] and new early abort [12] , step 3 discards wrong subkeys efficiently. Utilizing other two impossible differential trails, step 4-5 fix the common 8-byte subkey k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] 16 values of x MC 7,col(2) through the MC operation. For current (T 0, [14] , T 0, [14] ), the value of T AT 7, [9] can be obtained by accessing the table Q. Based on 2 16 pairs of ( x AT 7,col(2) , x SB 8,col(2) ), access the SB 7, [8] , the pair of (T 6, [8] , T 6, [8] ) can be obtained by accessing the table Q for the corresponding (T 0, [14] , T 0, [14] ART 6, [2, 3] through the ART operation. Then access the table H and obtain 2 9.6 values of x SR 7, [7, 10] through the SR operation. Calculate k * 7, [7, 10] such that k * 7, [7, 10] = x SR 7, [7, 10] x AK 7, [7, 10] . Construct a table M which has 2 24 addresses indexed by 3-byte equivalent subkey k * 7, [7, 8, 10] . For each address, store 0 or 1 and the initial value is 0. Then we set a counter by variable Flag with initial value 0. For each pair in the table R 2 , discard 2 9.6 wrong equivalent subkeys k * 7, [7, 8, 10] . We check if the value at corresponding address of k * 7, [7, 8, 10] is 0 in the table M . If so, update the location to 1 and increase the value of Flag by 1. If Flag = 2 24 , we judge that current subkey k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] |k * 8,SR[col(1,2)] is wrong. Then check the next subkey. If Flag < 2 24 after checking all the remaining pairs in the table R 2 , we search out all equivalent subkeys k * 7, [7, 8, 10] with M 1 [k * 7, [7, 8, 10] ] = 0. We conclude that corresponding subkeys k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] |k * 7, [7, 8, 10] [7, 8, 10] cannot pass the test, we conclude that the corresponding subkey k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] |k * 8,SR[col(1,2)] cannot pass the test. So the probability that a wrong subkey k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] are wrong, the current common 8-byte subkey k 0, [3, 4, 9, 14] |k * 8,SR[col (2) ] is wrong, so the probability that commom subkeys can pass the test of step 3 is
≈ 1 − e −2 56−1.4425×2 n−71. 4 , and the number of the remaining common subkeys is 2 64 × P 2 . 4) The complexity of step 4.1 is the same as the complexity of step 1. The time complexities of step 4.2 and 4.3 are 2 n+39 × P 2 and 2 114.5 × P 2 , respectively. 5) The complexity of step 5.1 is the same as the complexity of step 1. The time complexities of step 5.2 and 5.3 are 2 n+39 × (P 2 ) 2 and 2 114.5 × (P 2 ) 2 , respectively. 6) Take n = 77, and then obtain P 1 ≈ 2 −67 and P 2 ≈ 2 −14 . All in all, our attack needs 2 n+40 = 2 117 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is dominated by Data Collecting Phase, so the time complexity of our attack is 2 n+46.9 = 2 123.9 memory access. The memory complexity is decided by Data Collecting Phase, which requires 2 n+22.2 = 2 99.2 bytes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the first impossible differential cryptanalysis of Deoxys-BC-256 is proposed in the single-key model. We choose the input tweak difference with a single active byte T 0, [14] , thus obtaining a loose constraint (i.e. the key size should be less than 240 bits). Using the idea that tweak input allows to cancel a difference in the trail, we construct three 8-round impossible differential trails which are one more round than the best result of AES-128. Furthermore, combined various additional techniques (e.g. tweak schedule considerations), we improve the procedures of sieving subkeys, so as to improve the sieving efficiency and the complexities can be reduced. To the best of our knowledge, this is the best result of Deoxys-BC-256 in the single-key model so far.
